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Abstract 
 
We propose to estimate the economic cost for Palestine and for Palestinian residents due to 
the lack of peaceful resolution with Israel. Thereto we make use of the consensus estimates 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) of real growth rates of 
economic variables and of the nominal national accounts for Palestine over the period 1994-
2006. We identify four periods: 1994-1999 with high real growth rates of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and of gross national income (GNI); 2000-2002 with a strong decline; 2003-
2005 with a modest growth; and 2006 with a renewed decline. We derive the real national 
accounts (prices1999) for the end years: 1999, 2002 and 2005. It follows that over 2000-
2002 the real GDP declined by 27.5%; GNI by almost one third; but that real gross 
disposable income (GDI) “only” declined by 11.3%; and that over 2000-2005 the declines 
were 13.8% (GDP) ; about  20%(GNI); and 2.9% (GDI), respectively. Consequently, in 2005, 
the year preceding the renewed isolation of Palestine, real GDP, GNI and GDI were still 
below their 1999 level.  Based on the modest growth scenario of IMF and WB (3% real 
growth and 3% price increase) we estimate that over the period 2000-2002 the cost for 
Palestine, measured in terms of nominal GNI, was equal to the GNI of 1999 (5.5 billion US$), 
and over 2000-2005 to two-and-a-half times the 1999 GNI. Based on the same growth 
scenario, we estimate the loss for a Palestinian resident, measured in terms of nominal GDI 
per capita, to be 30% of the 1999 level by the end of 2002 and 25% by the end of 2005. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In a previous paper (Missaglia and De Boer, 2004)1 we simulated the impact of different 
foreign assistance policies on the economy of Palestine from the beginning of the second 
intifada, 29 September 2000, until ultimo 2002. Thereto we constructed a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model that we calibrated on the 1998 social accounting matrix 
(SAM) constructed by the World Bank (WB). Based on information supplied in the study WB 
(2003b)2 and on information obtained from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS) we gave a shock to the model and constructed a counterfactual SAM for 2002 on 
which we based our policy simulations.  
 At the time of writing we only disposed of estimates of the World Bank (WB, 2003 a, b, c) 
and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2003) of macro figures for 2002. We were 
struck by the fact that there were substantial differences between these estimates and we 
decided to propose our own evaluation (De Boer and Missaglia, 2006)3. Our conclusion was 
that our estimates with the help of a static CGE model were remarkably close to those of IMF 
that based its estimates on an entirely different methodology (a macro-founded income-
expenditure model). At the time of writing the first version of the last mentioned paper (March 
2004) we learned from private communications that IMF, WB and PCBS were closely 
working together to reach consensus estimates.  
 In March 2007, IMF and World Bank (IMF&WB, 2007) published a first assessment of the 
economic developments in 2006 of the economy of Palestine and provided, among others, 
the consensus estimates of the macroeconomic figures for 2002 using data that are more up-
to-date and more complete than the data IMF disposed of in 2003.  
  In De Boer and Missaglia (2007) we showed that our 2004 estimates of macro figures for 
2002 are closer to the 2007 consensus estimates by IMF and WB than the 2003 estimates of 
IMF. We argued that the shortening of the time horizon and the quantity adjustment following 
the dramatic shock explain why our model performed better.  
 In the present paper we only consider the consensus estimates of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (IMF&WB, 2007) and extend the period of interest from 
1999-2002 to 1994-2006. 
 In section 2 we summarize the most important political events of the last two decades with 
important economical consequences. Based on the real growth rates of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and gross national income (GNI) we distinguish four periods: 1994-1999 with 
high growth rates (on average: GDP 8.2%; GNI 9.2%); 2000-2002 with a strong decrease in 
GDP (on average 10.2%) and in GNI (on average 12.2%); 2003-2005 witnessing a modest 
recovery (both GDP and GNI increasing on average by 5.9%); and 2006 during which GDP 
decreased by 8.0% and GNI by 7.7%. It follows that three years are of special interest: 1999, 
the last complete year before the outbreak of the second intifada; 2002, the end of the period 
of strong decline; and 2005, the end of the period of modest recovery. 
 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank give the nominal national accounts 
from 1999 up to 2006 included, but do not give the real national accounts for 2002 and 2005. 
However, they supply the real growth rates of GDP, GNI and of gross disposable income 
(GDI), as well as the real growth rates of the components of GDP, enabling us to derive the 
real national accounts of 2002 and 2005 (prices 1999). In the appendix to this paper we give 
account of our computations. In section 3 we present the real national accounts for 1999, 
2002 and 2005, as well as a comparison between these years.  
 Having described the development of real GDP, its components, real GNI and GDI over the 
period 1999-2005, we turn to an assessment of the economic cost for Palestine due to the 
lack of peaceful resolution with Israel. The substantial decline in income earned in Israel and 
its settlements, a consequence of the Israeli policy of cutting back heavily on the issuance of 
work permits, is not incorporated in nominal gross domestic product. Therefore, we only give 
in section 4 an estimate of the economic cost for Palestine in terms of nominal gross national 
income (GNI). In order to estimate this cost, we need to have an estimate of GNI in the 
counterfactual situation that the lack of peaceful resolution did not take place. This estimate 
is based on the modest growth scenario, given in the footnote 7 of the report by IMF and 
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World Bank (IMF&WB, 2007): the real growth is put at 3%, whereas the price increase is put 
equal to 3%, as well. Based on this scenario the estimated cost over the period 2000-2002 is 
equal to 5,424 million US$, an amount equal to the consensus estimate of the GNI in 1999 
(5,454 million US$). At the end of 2005 the estimated cost equals 2.5 times the 1999 GNI, 
whereas the loss at the end of 2006 is more than three times the 1999 GNI.  
 However, the economic cost for a Palestinian resident was less dramatic than anticipated 
from the cost for Palestine in terms of nominal GNI. Real net current transfers, consisting of 
private remittances from the large Palestinian expatriate population and aid flows 
(emergency assistance and budget support), increased from 399 million US$ in 1999 to 
1,503 million US$ in 2002, and amounted to 1,298 million US$ in 2005. That is the reason 
why we also estimate the economic cost in terms of nominal GDI per capita. We use the 
same scenario of 3% real growth in GDI, together with a 3% price increase. In section 5 we 
present our findings: at the end of 2002 nominal GDI per capita decreased by 30% as 
compared to 1999, while at the end of the period of modest growth, 2005, the economic cost 
for a Palestinian amounted to an estimated loss of 25%. 
 Section 6, finally, contains our conclusions.   
 
2. Conflict and growth  
 
2.1. Conflict 
 
 We summarize the most important political events of the last two decades with important 
economical consequences.  
 In 1987 the first intifada (uprising) broke out and Hamas (in English: Islamic Resistance 
Movement) was founded. It is considered to be a terroristic organization by Western 
countries and is therefore not considered being a valid discussion partner in the peace 
process ever since. The first intifada formally ended with the 1993 Oslo agreements where 
Israel and the PLO recognized each other mutually. The main party in the PLO (Palestine 
Liberation Organization) was Fatah (in English: Palestinian National Liberation Movement), 
which, until 2003 was considered to be a terroristic organization, but became the discussion 
partner in the peace process ever since. Hamas was not a member of the PLO. In 1995 an 
Israeli extremist opposed to the peace accord assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It 
led to violence in Israel and in the Palestinian territories to which the government of Israel 
responded with frequent closures of the border implying that Palestinian workers could not 
go and work in Israel and its settlements causing a considerable loss in their earnings. On 29 
September 2000 the second intifada (Al Aqsa intifada) broke out. Besides closure, Israel 
reacted by a regime of check points and curfews in the Palestinian territories hindering the 
movement of people and goods, and by withholding the revenues (import duties and VAT) 
that Israel collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Although the second intifada 
never ended formally, some people consider the Road map to peace of the Quartet: 
European Union, Russia, United Nations and United States in April 2003 as the beginning of 
a new period in the history of Palestine. In January 2006 Hamas won the general elections 
and the Hamas-led government was confronted with a diplomatic and financial isolation by 
the international community, with internal tensions, and with tensions with Israel. In June 
2007 Hamas seized power in the Gaza strip. In December 2007 the donor conference was 
held in Paris at which the Palestinian Authority asked for 5.5 billion US$ for financing its 
Reform and Development Program for 2008-2010 and at which donors pledged 7 billion 
US$.   
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2.2. Growth  
 
 In March 2003 the International Monetary Fund published the report “West Bank and Gaza: 
Economic Performance and Reform under Conflict Condition” (IMF, 2003) that dealt with the 
economic consequences of the second intifada over the period 2000-2002. From this 
publication we took the growth rates of real gross domestic production (GDP) and of real 
gross national income (GNI) over the period 1995-2000 that are reported below in the 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.   
 In March 2007 IMF and World Bank published the report “West Bank and Gaza: Economic 
Developments in 2006- A First Assessment” (IMF&WB, 2007) which dealt with the economic 
consequences of the victory of Hamas at the general elections in 2006. It was used during 
the preparation of the donor conference held on 17 December 2007 in Paris. From this 
publication we take the growth rates of real GDP, real GDI and of  real gross disposable 
income (GDI) over the period 1999-2006 reported below in the columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 
1. The growth rates for 1999 and 2000 are the same in both publications. In the columns 5, 6 
and 7 we give the index numbers of real GDP, GNI and GDI. We choose as base year 1999, 
the last complete year before the outbreak of the second intifada (on 29 September 2000). 
 
Table 1. Growth rates  and index numbers of real GDP, GNI and GDI  
1 
Year 
2 
Growth rate 
real GDP 
3 
Growth 
rate 
real GNI 
4 
Growth 
rate 
real GDI 
5 
Index number 
real GDP 
6 
Index 
number 
real GNI 
7 
Index 
number 
Real GDI 
1994    67.3 64.5  
1995   6.1  8.5  71.4 70.0  
1996   2.5  0.8  73.2 70.6  
1997 12.2 12.4  82.1 79.3  
1998 11.8 16.3  91.8 92.3 92.8 
1999   8.9  8.4  7.8       100      100      100 
2000  -5.4  -6.8 -3.5 94.6 93.2 96.5 
2001 -15.4     -20.1 -4.4 80.0 74.5 92.3 
2002  -9.4  -9.1 -3.8 72.5 67.7 88.7 
2003  5.8  6.6 -0.4 76.7 72.2 88.4 
2004  6.0  4.3 4.4 81.3 75.3 92.3 
2005  6.0  6.8 5.2 86.2 80.4 97.1 
2006 -8.0 -7.6 0.0 79.3 74.3 97.1 
 
Based on the real growth rates we distinguish four periods: 
 
1. 1994-1999 (Post Oslo; pre-second intifada): high growth 
 
 During this period real GDP and real GNI, with the exception of 1996, showed a high growth 
rate: real GDP increased on average by 8.2% per year and real GNI on average by 9.2% per 
year. In November 2005 Rabin was assassinated leading to violence and to frequent closure 
of the border so that Palestinian workers could not go and work in Israel or in its settlements. 
Since income from labor in Israel is an important source of revenues (in 1999, for instance, 
net factor income amounted to 20.7% of GDP, see Table 2 below) the growth rates of real 
GDP and real GNI decreased drastically (to 2.5 and 0.8 percent, respectively). 
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2. 2000-2002 (Second intifada): strong decline  
 
  During this period there is a strong decrease in real GDP (on average 10.2%) and in GNI 
(on average 12.2%). The three main causes are closure, namely the imposition of restrictions 
on the movement of goods and services across borders and within Palestine, destruction of 
capital, and withholding of clearance revenues by Israel. The World Bank (WB, 2003b) 
estimated the number of Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements in September 
2000 at 128,000. With the outbreak of the second intifada Israel cut back heavily on the 
issuance of work permits. In the last months of 2002 it begun to increase the number of work 
permits. The World Bank estimated that at the end of 2002 about 32,000 work permits were 
issued, though only half of these were actually being used. The physical damage resulting 
from the conflict was estimated to be US$ 305 million by the end of 2001 and US$ 930 
million by the end of 2002. As a result of damage and fall in investment, the real productive 
capital stock declined by US$ 1.7 billion between 1999 and 2002. IMF (2003) estimated the 
withholding of clearance revenues to amount to US$ 1,749 million in 2001 and US$ 1,275 
million in 2002. The cumulative amount, US$ 3,024 million, is equivalent to 67% of the GDP 
of 1999 (US$ 4,517 million, see Table 2 below). 
 In the columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1 we give, in bold, the index numbers for 2002. 
Compared to 1999 real GDP declined by 27.5%, real GNI by about one third, whereas real 
GDI “only” decreased by 11.3%. In section 3 we will have a closer look at these figures. 
 
3. 2003-2005 (Road map to peace): modest recovery 
 
 During this period real GDP and real GNI showed a modest growth: both increased on 
average by 5.9 % per year. Since the real growth rates in GDP and GNI in 2003 are almost 
equal to those of 2004 and 2005, we conclude that, from the economical point of view, the 
end of the second intifada can be dated at ultimo 2002; the intifada started on 29 September 
2000, so that, from the economical point of view, it lasted twenty-seven months.  
 In the columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1 we give, in bold, the index numbers for 2005. 
Compared to 1999 real GDP declined by 13.8%, real GNI by about 20%, whereas real GDI 
“only” decreased by 2.9%. In section 3 we will have a closer look at these figures. 
 
4. 2006-present (Post election victory of Hamas) 
 
 On 25 January 2006 Hamas won the parliamentary elections: it obtained 76 on 132 seats. In 
March the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government was formed. It was confronted with 
diplomatic and financial isolation by the international community, and with internal and 
external tensions. The first assessment of IMF and World Bank of the economical 
consequences of the isolation is a decrease in real GDP by 8.0% and a decrease by 7.7% in 
real GNI.  
  
3. Strong decline (2000-2002) and modest recovery (2003-2005) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 In the previous section we identified a period with a strong decline, followed by a period with 
a modest recovery. It followed that three years are of special interest: 1999, the last complete 
year before the second intifada; 2002, the end of the period of strong decline; and 2005, the 
end of the period of modest recovery. 
 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank do not give the real national accounts 
for 2002 and 2005, but they can be derived from data supplied in their publication: IMF&WB 
(2007, Tables 2 and 3). In the appendix to this paper we derive in the Tables A2 and A4 the 
real national accounts for 2002 and 2005, as well as the relevant index numbers. Table 2 
summarizes the computations; the columns 2, 3 and 4 are taken from Table A2 (columns 3, 
5 and 6), whereas the columns 5, 6, and 7 are taken from Table A4 (columns 4, 6 and 5).  
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Table 2. Consensus estimates of IMF&WB (2007) of the real national accounts of 1999, 2002  
              and 2005 (millions US$,1999 prices) and index numbers  
1 2 
1999 
3 
2002 
4 
Index 2002 
(1999=100)
5 
2005 
6 
Index 2005 
(2002=100) 
7 
Index 2005 
(1999=100)
Household consumption 4,510 3,675 81.5 4,442 120.9 98.5 
Consumption PA 1,049    956 91.1 1,084 113.3     100.3 
Gross private investment 1,415    533 37.7    632 118.4 44.6 
Gross investment  PA    320    222 69.6    279 125.5 87.3 
Change in inventories    151      23 15.1     23 100.0 15.1 
Exports    896    467 52.1   548 117.3 61.2 
Imports (-) 3,824 2,602 68.1 3,114 119.7 81.4 
Gross domestic product 4,517 3,275       72.5 3,893 118.9 86.2 
Net factor income    937    417 44.5   490 117.7 52.3 
Gross national income 5,454 3,692 67.7 4,384 118.7 80.4 
Net current transfers    399 1,503     376.7 1,298   86.4     325.4 
Gross disposable income 5,853 5,194 88.7 5,682 109.4 97.1 
 
3.2. Strong decline (2000-2002) 
 
 In section 2 we already concluded from the data given in Table 1 that the index numbers for 
real GDP, GNI and GDI for 2002 (with base year 1999=100) were 72.5; 67.7; and 88.7, 
respectively. In the columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2 information on the components of real 
GDP, GNI and GDI is supplied.  
 We observe that household consumption decreased by 18.5%; whereas the PA 
consumption, mainly the wage bill of civil servants, dropped by only 8.9%.  
 Gross private investment witnessed a huge decrease, more than 60%, while PA investment 
dropped by 30%.The change in inventories is but a minor item. 
 Exports fell by almost 50%, whereas imports decreased by 32%. The trade deficit in 1999 
amounted to 2,928 million US$, whereas the deficit in 2002 was equal to 2,135 million; a 
decrease of 27%.The real gross domestic product, as said before, decreased by 27.5%.  
 In 1999 the net factor income amounted to 937 million US$, which is 20.7% of GDP, a figure 
given in the previous section. It dropped to 417 million $. Because of the Israeli policy of 
closure income earned in Israel and its settlements fell by 55%.The real gross national 
income, as said before, decreased by one third. 
 Private remittances from the large Palestinian expatriate population and aid flows 
(emergency assistance and budget support) were almost multiplied by the factor 4, so that, 
thanks to these net current transfers, the real GDI only dropped by 11.3%. Real net current 
transfers served as cushion: in 1999 it amounted to 7.9% of GNI, whereas in 2002 it rose to  
40.7% ! 
 
3.3. Modest recovery (2003-2005) 
 
3.3.1. Comparison with 2002 
 
 It follows from column 6 of Table 2 that real GDP and real GDI both grew by about 19% as 
compared to the last year of the period of strong decline (2002). Most components grew in 
the same order of magnitude; the consumption of the PA lagging slightly behind with an 
increase of 13.3%. But this was compensated by an increase of its investments by 25.5%: if 
we take the sum of PA consumption and PA investment, then the real expenditure of the PA 
was equal to 1,178 million US$ in 2002 and to 1,363 million US$ in 2005 (an increase by 
15.7%). During this period inventories, as said before a minor item, were estimated to remain 
at their 2002 level. 
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 Real GNI only grew by 9.4%. This was caused by the fact that real net current transfers 
declined by 13.6%: emergency assistance and budget support diminished because of the 
recovery of Palestinian economy. Real net current transfers, equivalent to 40.7% of real GNI 
in 2002, decreased to 29.6% of real GNI in 2005. 
 
3.3.2. Comparison with 1999 
 
 In section 2 we already concluded from the data given in Table 1 that the index numbers for 
real GDP, GNI and GDI for 2005 (with base year 1999=100) were 86.2; 80.4; and 97.1, 
respectively. In the columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 2 information on the components of real 
GDP, GNI and GDI is supplied.  
 Consumption of households is almost back at its 1999 level, whereas there is a very small 
increase in PA consumption. The decline in GDP of 13.8% is caused by a strong decline in 
private and PA investment (55% and 13%, respectively) and by the deterioration of the trade 
balance: exports declined by almost 40%, while imports “only” declined by almost 20%.  
 From 2002 to 2005 net factor income rose by 17.7%, but this increase hardly caught up the 
deterioration between 1999 and 2002. In 2002 real net factor income dropped to 44.5% of 
the pre-intifada level (1999), whereas in 2005 it was only equal to 52.3% of the level of 1999. 
This decline by 47.7%, as compared to 1999, caused the decline of almost 20% in GNI.  
 Net current transfers declined in 2005 by 13.6% as compared to 2002, but this decline was 
largely offset by the increase of 276.7% between 1999 and 2002. As compared to 1999 real 
net current transfers in 2005 increased by 225.4%, so that real GDI only decreased by 2.9%. 
 According to all indicators (GDP, GNI and GDI) the large decline in the Palestinian economy 
during the twenty-seven months of intifada was not caught up by the end of 2005; the year 
preceding the negative impact on the economy of Hamas’ victory at the January 2006 
general elections that led to a renewed isolation of Palestine.  
 
4. Economic cost in terms of nominal gross national income 
 
 The consequence of the Israeli policy of cutting back heavily on the issuance of work 
permits, the substantial decline in income earned in Israel and its settlements, is not 
incorporated in nominal gross domestic product. That is the reason why we only give an 
estimate of the economic cost for Palestine, due to the lack of peaceful resolution with Israel, 
in terms of nominal gross national income (GNI).   
 In order to estimate this cost, we need to have an estimate of GNI in the counterfactual 
situation that the lack of peaceful resolution did not take place. This estimate is based on the 
modest growth scenario, given in the footnote 7 of the report by IMF and World Bank 
(IMF&WB, 2007).The real growth is put at 3%, which is modest, because in the period of the 
Road map to peace (2003-2005) GNI grew on average by 5.9% per year (see our Table 1). 
The price increase in the growth scenario is also put at 3%. 
 In the second column of Table 3 we give the realized nominal GNI as reported by IMF&WB 
(2007, Table 3), whereas in the third column we calculate the nominal GNI according to the 
growth scenario (all figures reading in millions of US$). In column 4 we estimate the cost by 
subtracting the figures in column 2 from those in column 3, whereas in column 5 we give the 
cumulated cost (million US$). In the sixth column we give the figures in column 4 as 
percentage of the nominal GNI of 1999 whereas in column 7 we cumulate these 
percentages. 
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Table 3. Estimated economic cost due to lack of peaceful resolution with Israel 
             (columns 2-5: millions US$, current prices; columns 6-7: % of GNI 1999) 
 
*Real growth: 3%; price increase: 3%. 
 
 The second intifada broke out on 29 September 2000 so that the cost in 2000 is incurred 
over a period of three months only: it amounted to 512 million US$, representing 9.4% of GNI 
of 1999.  
  In section 2 we concluded that from the economical point of view the end of the second 
intifada can be dated at ultimo 2002. It follows from column 5 that the cumulated estimated 
cost amounted to 5,424 million US$ which is equivalent to the nominal GNI of 1999 (5,454 
million US). It is as if the residents of Palestine completely stopped working in Palestine and 
in Israel and its settlements for one year out of 27 months. The estimated cost is also 
equivalent to the amount of 5.5 billion US$ that the Palestinian Authority asked at the 17 
December 2007 Paris donor conference for financing its Reform and Development Program 
2008-2010. 
During the period of the Road map to peace (2003-2005) the estimated cost, based on the 
modest growth scenario of 3% real growth and 3% price increase, declined only marginally 
from 54.4% of 1999 GNI in 2002 to 50.6%, as can be seen from column 6. The cumulated 
cost over this period amounted to 150% of 1999 GNI. If we add this to the cumulative cost 
over the period of the second intifada (almost 100% of 1999 GNI), we arrive at an estimated 
cost of 2.5 times the nominal 1999 GNI by the end of 2005.  
According to the first assessment of IMF and World Bank of the economical consequences 
of the victory of Hamas at the general elections of January 2006, the estimated cost in 2006 
rose from 50.6% in 2005 to 60.9% and the cumulated estimated cost to 313.6%. This means 
that over a period of six years and a quarter (29 September 2000- ultimo 2006) the estimated 
cost is about three GNI’s of 1999. 
 
5. Economic cost in terms of nominal gross disposable income per capita 
 
  Real net current transfers increased from 399 million US$ in 1999 to 1,503 million US$ in 
2002, and amounted to 1,298 million US$ in 2005 (see Table 1). This huge increase was the 
reason why real GDI decreased by “”only” 11.3% over the period 1999-2002 (real GNI 
decreasing by one third), and why it “only” decreased by 2.9% over the period 1999-2005 
(real GNI decreasing by almost 20%). Consequently, the economic cost for a Palestinian 
resident was less dramatic than anticipated from the cost in terms of nominal GNI evaluated 
in the previous section. That is the reason why we also estimate the economic cost in terms 
of nominal GDI per capita. As in section 4 we need to have an estimate of GDI in the 
counterfactual situation that the lack of peaceful resolution did not take place. As before, we 
base our estimate on the modest growth scenario of 3% real growth and 3% price increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
GNI  
consensus 
estimates  
IMF&WB  
3 
GNI growth 
scenario 
IMF&WB* 
 
4 
Estimated 
cost 
 
5 
Estimated 
cost 
(cumulative) 
 
6 
Estimated 
cost 
(% 1999) 
7 
Estimated 
cost 
(cumulative % 
1999) 
 
1999 5,454 5,454     
2000 5,274 5,786   512    512   9.4    9.4 
2001 4,193 6,139 1,946  2,458 35.7  45.1 
2002 3,546 6,512 2,966  5,424 54.4  99.4 
2003 4,105 6,909 2,804  8,228 51.4 150.9 
2004 4,534 7,330 2,796 11,024 51.3 202.1 
2005 5,017  7,776 2,759 13,783 50.6 250.7 
2006 4,929 8,250 3,321 17,104 60.9 313.6 
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 In the second column of Table 4 we give the realized nominal GDI as reported by the 
IMF&WB (2007, Table 3), whereas in the third column we calculate the nominal GDI 
according to the growth scenario (all figures reading in millions of US$). The fourth column 
contains the realized nominal GDI per capita (IMF&WB, 2007, Table 4). From the columns 2 
and 4 we can derive the size of the population in the various years which are used in the 
derivation of the nominal GDI per capita reported upon in column 5. The estimated cost in 
terms of GDI per capita are given in the sixth column, while in column 7 the cost is given as 
percentage of the GDI per capita in 1999. 
 
Table 4 Estimated loss due to lack of peaceful resolution (columns 2-3: millions US$, current  
             prices; columns 4 and 5 US$; columns 6-7: % of GNI 1999) 
 
*Real growth: 3%; price increase: 3%. 
 
 The realized nominal GDI per capita amounted to 1,938 US$ per capita in 1999 and it 
decreased to 1,697 US$ by the end of 2002; a decrease by about one quarter. Thereafter, 
there is a modest increase to 1,724 US$ per capita by the end of 2005; still 11% below the 
1999 level.   
 The estimated cost amounts 590 US$ per capita by the end of 2002, a decrease of 30% as 
compared to 1999. From 2002 to 2005 the estimated cost decreases, but the catch-up is 
very modest: by the end of 2005 there is still a decrease of about 25% as compared to the 
pre-intifada level. According to IMF&WB’s first assessment, the cost in 2006 rose to 513 US$ 
per capita, an increase by one percentage point as compared to 2005. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
 In this paper we used the consensus estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (WB) of the national accounts of Palestine over the period 1994-2006 
(IMF&WB, 2007). Based on the real growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) and gross 
national income (GNI), we distinguished four periods: 
 
1. 1994-1999, during which real GDP and real GNI showed a high growth rate: real GDP 
increased on average by 8.2% per year and real GNI on average by 9.2% per year. 
 
2. 2000-2002, during which there is a strong decrease in real GDP (on average 10.2% per 
year) and in GNI (on average 12.2% per year). The three main causes are closure, namely 
the imposition of restrictions on the movement of goods and services across borders and 
within Palestine, destruction of capital, and withholding of clearance revenues by Israel.  
 
1 
Year 
2 
 GDI 
consensus 
estimates 
IMF&WB 
3 
GDI 
growth 
scenario*  
 
4 
GDI 
per capita 
consensus
estimates 
IMF&WB 
5 
GDI  
per capita 
growth 
scenario* 
6 
Estimated 
loss 
 
5-4 
7 
Estimated
loss 
(% 1999) 
1999 5,853 5,853 1,938 1,938   
2000 5,860 6,209 1,861 1,972 111  5.7 
2001 5,557 6,588 1,697 2,012 315 16.2 
2002 4,985 6,989 1,469 2,059 590 30.5 
2003 5,395 7,414 1,535 2,110 575 29.6 
2004 5,951 7,866 1,636 2,162 526 27.2 
2005 6,486 8,345 1,724 2,218 494 25.5 
2006 6,859 8,853 1,764 2,277 513 26.5 
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3. 2003-2005, during which real GDP and real GNI both increased on average by a modest 
5.9 % per year.  
 
4. 2006, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government was confronted with diplomatic and 
financial isolation by the international community, and with internal and external tensions. 
The first assessment of IMF and World Bank of the economical consequences of the 
isolation is a decrease in real GDP of 8.0% and a decrease of 7.7% in real GNI.  
 
 Since the real growth rates in GDP and GNI in 2003 are almost equal to those of 2004 and 
2005, we concluded that, from the economical point of view, the end of the second intifada 
can be dated at ultimo 2002; the intifada started on 29 September 2000, so that, from the 
economical point of view, it lasted twenty-seven months.  
  
 It also followed that three years are of special interest: 1999, the last complete year before 
the second intifada; 2002, the end of the period of strong decline; and 2005, the end of the 
period of modest recovery. In section 3 we presented the real national accounts for these 
three years.  
 
 As compared to 1999, real GDP in 2002 decreased by 27.5%. Because of the Israeli policy 
of closure income earned in Israel and its settlements fell by 55% and the real gross national 
income decreased even more than GDP: it declined by one third. Private remittances from 
the large Palestinian expatriate population and aid flows (emergency assistance and budget 
support) were almost multiplied by the factor 4 so that the real gross disposable income 
(GDI) “only” dropped by 11.3%. Real net current transfers served as cushion: in 1999 it 
amounted to 7.9% of GNI, whereas in 2002 it rose to 40.7%.  
 
 As compared to 2002, real GDP and real GDI both grew by about 19% over the period 
2003-2005, while real GNI only grew by 9.4%. This was caused by the fact that real net 
current transfers declined by 13.6%.  
 
 As compared to 1999, real GDP in 2005 declined by 13.8%. From 2002 to 2005 net factor 
income rose by 17.7%, but as compared to 1999 it decreased by 47.7% causing a decline of 
almost 20% in GNI. Net current transfers declined in 2005 by 13.6% as compared to 2002, 
but this decline was largely offset by the increase between 1999 and 2002. As compared to 
1999 real net current transfers in 2005 increased by 225.4%, so that real GDI “only” 
decreased by 2.9%. 
 
 According to all indicators (GDP, GNI and GDI) the large decline in the Palestinian economy 
during the twenty-seven months of intifada has not been caught up by the end of 2005.  
 
 In section 4 we gave an estimate of the economic cost for Palestine, due to the lack of 
peaceful resolution with Israel, in terms of nominal gross national income (GNI).  Thereto, we 
needed an estimate of GNI in the counterfactual situation that the lack of peaceful resolution 
did not take place. We based this estimate on the modest growth scenario given by IMF and 
World Bank (IMF&WB, 2007): real growth was put at 3%, and the price increase at 3%, as 
well. Based on this scenario the estimated cost over the period 2000-2002 is equal to 5,424 
million US$, an amount equal to the consensus estimate of the GNI in 1999 (5,454 million 
US$). It is as if the residents of Palestine completely stopped working in Palestine and in 
Israel and its settlements for one year out of 27 months of intifada. The estimated cost is also 
equivalent to the amount of 5.5 billion US$ that the Palestinian Authority asked at the 17 
December 2007 Paris donor conference for financing its Reform and Development Program 
2008-2010.  
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At the end of 2005 the estimated cost equaled 2.5 times the 1999 GNI, and by the end of 
2006 more than three. This means that over a period of six years and a quarter (29 
September 2000- ultimo 2006) Palestine lost about three GNI’s of 1999. 
 
 However, the economic cost for a Palestinian resident was less dramatic than anticipated 
from the cost for Palestine in terms of nominal GNI. Real net current transfers in 2002 were 
276% higher than in 1999, whereas in 2005 they were 225% higher. In section 5 we 
estimated the economic cost in terms of nominal GDI per capita. We used the same scenario 
of 3% real growth in GDI; together with a 3% price increase for the counterfactual situation 
that the lack of peaceful resolution did not take place. According to our calculations, nominal 
GDI per capita decreased by 30% at the end of 2002, as compared to 1999, while at the end 
of 2005, the economic cost for a Palestinian amounted to an estimated loss of 25%. 
 
 The conclusion of this paper is far from being original:  the economy of Palestine has been 
hit very hard ever since the outbreak of the second intifada and the economical situation of 
its residents have severely deteriorated. This calls for a peaceful resolution and a massive 
financial support from the international community.  
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Appendix: Derivation of the consensus estimates of the real national accounts of 2002 
and 2005  
 
 IMF&WB (2007) do not give the National Accounts in real terms, but we can derive them 
from the data contained in their Tables 2 and 3.  
 Below, we first give account of the derivation of the National Accounts for 2002 in real terms. 
In the columns 2-4 of table A1 the percentage changes in macro variables for the years 
2000, 2001 and 2002 have been taken from Table 2 of IMF&WB (2007). In column 5 the 
index numbers are computed. The index of real household consumption, for instance, is 
equal to: [(1-0.044)x(1-0.054)x(1-0.085)]x100 =82.7504. 
 
Table A1. Percentage changes in real macro variables and computation of the index  
                numbers for 2002 (1999=100) 
1 
Macro variable 
2 
2000 
3 
2001 
4 
2002 
5 
Index number  
(1999=100) 
Household consumption   -4.4  -5.4  -8.5 82.7504 
Consumption PA*    9.4 -11.6  -4.3 92.5511 
Gross private investment -26.5 -52.1   8.7 38.2695 
Gross investment  PA* -29.4   -9.9 11.1 70.6714 
Change in inventories -73.5   -8.9 -36.7 15.2816 
Exports   -6.8 -34.7 -13.0 52.9479 
Imports  -13.9 -18.1   -2.0 69.1056 
Gross domestic product  (GDP)   -5.4 -15.4   -9.4           72.5086 
Gross national income     (GNI)   -6.8 -20.1   -9.1 67.6903 
Gross disposable income (GDI)   -3.5   -4.4   -3.8 88.7483 
 
*PA stands for Palestinian Authority. 
 
 In column 2 of Table A2 the components of GDP in 1999 are taken from Table 3 of IMF&WB 
(2007). Calculating GDP from these figures, we arrive at 4,495 million US$, whereas the 
GDP reported in Table 3 of IMF&WB (2007) is equal to 4,517 million. In column 3 we balance 
the figures by multiplying the components of column 2 by the factor 4,517/4,495. We give the 
values of GNI and of GDI reported in Table 3 of IMF&WB. The value for net factor income is 
computed by taking the difference between GNI and GDP and the value of net current 
transfers by taking the difference between GDI and GNI.  
 Next, we multiply the figures of the components of GDP given in column 3 by the index 
numbers (divided by 100) calculated in column 5 of Table A1. According to these figures 
GDP is equal to 3,326 million US$. On the other hand, the GDP of 1999 given in column 3 
(4,517) multiplied by the pertinent index number (divided by 100) in column 5 of Table A1 
(0.725086) yields a value of 3,275 million US$. In column 4 we balance the figures of column 
3 by multiplying them by the factor 3,275/3,326. In column 5 of Table A2, finally, we give the 
index numbers computed. 
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Table A2. Consensus estimates of IMF&WB (2007) of the real national accounts for 2002 
                (US$ million, prices 1999) and index numbers 2002 (1999=100) 
 
1 
Macro variable 
2 
1999 
3 
1999 
(balanced)
4 
2002 
5 
2002 
(balanced) 
6 
2002 (index  
1999=100) 
Household consumption 4,488 4,510 3,732 3,675 81.5 
Consumption PA 1,044 1,049    971   956 91.1 
Gross private investment 1,408 1,415    541   533 37.7 
Gross investment  PA   318    320    226   222 69.6 
Change in inventories   150   151     23     23 15.1 
Exports   892   896   475   467 52.1 
Imports (-) 3,805 3,824 2,642 2,602 68.1 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 4,495 4,517 3,326      3,275        72.5 
Net factor income     937    417 44.5 
Gross national income    (GNI)  5,454  3,692 67.7 
Net current transfers     399  1,503      376.7 
Gross disposable income(GDI)  5,853  5,194 88.7 
 
 Secondly, we derive the national accounts in real terms for 2005. In column 2 of Table A3 
we give the index numbers of 2002 (1999=100) reported in column 5 of Table A1. The data 
in the columns 3, 4 and 5 are taken from Table 2 of IMF& WB (2007). In column 6 we give 
the computed index numbers of 2005 (1999=100). 
 
Table A3. Percentage changes in real macro variables and computation of the index  
                numbers 2005 (1999=100) 
1 
Macro variable 
2 
Index  
2002 
(1999=100) 
3 
2003 
4 
2004 
5 
2005 
6 
Index 
2005 
(1999=100) 
Household consumption 82.7504   6.0 8.5 5.6 100.5008 
Consumption PA 92.5511    -1.6 9.5 5.7 105.4061 
Gross private investment 38.2695  16.9 0.4 1.4  45.5448 
Gross investment  PA 70.6714  20.6 1.2 3.3  89.0988 
Change in inventories 15.2816     0     0      0  15.2816 
Exports 52.9479    -4.0    13.5 8.2  62.4227 
Imports  69.1056  4.8 9.9 4.4  83.0946 
Gross domestic product  72.5086  5.8 6.0 6.0  86.1960 
Gross national income      67.6903  6.6 4.3 6.8  80.3784 
Gross disposable income 88.7483   -0.4 4.4 5.2  97.0814 
 
 In column 2 of Table A4 the components of GDP in 1999 are taken from column 3 of Table 
A2 above. We multiply the figures of the components of GDP given in this column 2 by the 
corresponding index numbers computed in column 6 of Table A3 above.    
 Calculating GDP from these figures, we arrive at 3,973 million US$. On the other hand, the 
GDP of 1999 given in column 2 (4,517) multiplied by the pertinent index number (divided by 
100) in column 6 of Table A3 (0.861960) yields a value of 3,893 million US$.    
 In column 4 we balance the figures of column 3 by multiplying them by the factor 
3,893/3,973. Next, we multiply GNI (5,454) and GDI (5,853) of 1999 given in column 2 by the 
pertinent index numbers (divided by 100) given in column 6 of Table A3 (0.803784 and 
0.970814, respectively) to obtain GNI and GDI of 2005. Then, the value for net factor income 
is computed by taking the difference between GNI and GDP and the value of net current 
transfers by taking the difference between GDI and GNI. In column 5 we give the index 
numbers of 2005 with base year 1999=100, whereas, using the real national accounts for 
 14 
 
2002 given in column 4 of Table A2 above, we give in column 6 the index numbers of 2005 
with base year 2002 =100.  
 
Table A4. Consensus estimates of IMF&WB (2007) of the real national accounts for 2005  
                (US$ million, prices 1999) and index numbers for 2005 (1999=100) and for 2005  
                (2002=100) 
 
1 
Macro variable 
2 
1999 
(balanced)
3 
2005 
4 
2005 
(balanced) 
5 
2005  
(index 
1999=100) 
6 
2005 
(index 
2002=100)
Household consumption 4,510 4,533 4,442 98.5 120.9 
Consumption PA 1,049 1,106 1,084      100.3 113.3 
Gross private investment 1,415   644    632 44.6 118.4 
Gross investment  PA    320   285    279 87.3 125.5 
Change in inventories   151     23     23 15.0 100.0 
Exports   896    560   548 61.2 117.3 
Imports (-) 3,824 3,177 3,114 81.4 119.7 
Gross domestic product  4,517 3,973 3,893 86.2 118.9 
Net factor income    937    490 52.3 117.7 
Gross national income     5,454  4,384 80.4 118.7 
Net current transfers    399  1,298      325.4   86.4 
Gross disposable income 5,853  5,682 97.1 109.4 
 
                                                
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Second International Conference of the 
Middle East Economic Association, Paris, France, June 2003. 
2 The reports of De Boer and Missaglia (2007), IMF&WB (2007), IMF (2003) and WB (2003a,b,c) can 
be found at http://people.few.eur.nl/pmdeboer/research. 
3 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Third International Conference of the Middle 
East Economic Association, Byblos, Lebanon, May 2004. 
 
